T here are 2 well-known findings in the utility assessment literature: First, patients tend to assign higher utilities to their health state than the general public does. This is a consistent finding that begs the question whose utilities to use in cost-effectiveness analyses that inform decisions for resource allocation. 1 Second, utilities are unstable. The same people can produce different utilities about the same health states at different times in their lives. Even though the evidence for this is not equivocal, 2,3 the question about the "best" time to elicit utilities remains.
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In addition to methodological issues about how well health states are described to respondents, the between-and within-subject variation in utilities has been attributed to a number of psychological phenomena, some of them related or overlapping (see also Ubel and others 4 ):
• Different reference points: people assess health states with reference to their current state of health. According to prospect theory, expectations and social comparisons are also likely to influence reference points. • Reference points shift as one passes from health to disease, from disease to health, or from one stage of disease to another. • The "focusing illusion": Nonpatients tend to focus on aspects of life affected by illness, ignoring aspects of life that remain unaffected. • People fail to predict the physical and/or psychological adaptation to a health state over time.
• Discounting: People are inaccurate in their predictions of how bad a health state will feel. • The "hot-cold empathy gap" 5 : People fail to predict how an affectively "hot" state (anger, fear, pain, sadness) could affect their behavior. When in such state, people project how they feel now to a time in the future ("projection bias" 6 ) and thus fail to predict their preferences accurately. • Poor "hedonic accounting": People fail to average across their experiences with a health state and base their preferences on the most recent or most extreme experience. • The mechanisms of adaptation level theory 7 :
Contrasting (using extreme reference points from an exceptional past experience to judge current events) and habituation (exposure to an exceptional state over time lessens its impact). This is how a frequently quoted study 8 explained why lottery winners were not happier than controls and could not enjoy ordinary pleasures to the same extent.
Three articles in this issue of Medical Decision Making deal with aspects of utility elicitation and the assessment of health preferences. [9] [10] [11] Ditto and colleagues 9 studied the effects of temporary hospitalization on preferences for life-sustaining treatments in older outpatients. They modeled their study on Christensen-Szalanski's study on preferences for anesthesia use during labor. 12 Christensen-Szalanski found that a clear preference to avoid anesthesia expressed 1 month before labor shifted to strong preference for anesthesia as labor progressed. The study showed the transient nature of utilities in the face of significant pain and discomfort.
Our inaccuracy in predicting how bad a health state will feel becomes important when assessing temporary, acute conditions, for example, pain in labor. This can lead one to assign utilities that are likely to shift during direct experience of those conditions. Experiencing a temporary, unpleasant health state does not necessarily have an enduring impact on utilities. Findings about women's memory of the pain of labor are mixed, but people in general have poor memory of pain in terms of reliving it in imagination. 13 One month after delivery, the women in Christensen-Szalanski's study returned to the initially expressed preference to avoid anesthesia. Three months after hospitalization, half of the people who had expressed an initial wish for life-sustaining treatments in the Ditto study reaffirmed this wish, when the pain and discomfort were a memory. It is also remarkable that direct experience of the health state being assessed was not necessary and that pain and discomfort emanating from other health states had a spillover effect and influenced preferences. The influence of one's current emotional state is an important factor in decision making and the expression of preferences. 13, 14 The invasiveness of life-sustaining treatments can also influence preferences. Overall, most respondents in the Ditto study did not want treatment in the presented scenarios but antibiotic therapy was more preferred than more invasive treatments. Preferences for antibiotic therapy remained stable and were not affected by hospitalization, whereas preferences for invasive treatments decreased shortly after discharge from the hospital. Patients in pain are vulnerable to their doctors' suggestions. Sullivan and others 15 interviewed 15 respiratory physicians about the information that they give to patients with end-stage chronic obstructive pulmonary disease in relation to intubation and mechanical ventilation. All but one admitted to framing information in order to influence patient choice, according to their expectations for the patient's outcome. Mechanical ventilation is an invasive treatment. Emphasizing its negative aspects (inability to eat, talk or move, complications, etc.) could shift earlier "want ventilation" preferences. 16 On the basis of the Ditto findings, such preferences in those circumstances are likely to shift.
How then do "do not want ventilation" preferences fare when patients are faced with the real possibility of death? Will the experienced pain and discomfort solidify their earlier preference or will fear shift it? The methodological difficulty of studying real cases means that currently no evidence exists. Qualitative research, for example, interviews with survivors whose "do not want" advance directives changed whey they subsequently became ill, may be a way of increasing our understanding of these important preference shifts. Qualitative methods have not been used much by researchers of utility elicitation problems. Their potential is demonstrated in the van Osch and others article 10 that used think-aloud methodology to explore how respondents set the reference point and compare options in a standard gamble task. Process tracing techniques 17 and/or post hoc interviews with respondents could help explain some of the between-and withinsubject variation in utilities.
Finally, Goldberg's article 11 explores the influence of the "disease path" in health state descriptions, that is, the way in which a patient arrived at a health state. The study produced consistent findings about the way patients assessed erectile dysfunction (ED), when the disease path matched their experiences. Irrespective of their sexual functioning, prostate cancer patients who evaluated ED acquired due to prostate cancer treatment and diabetics who evaluated ED acquired as a result of diabetes complications gave higher ED ratings than when assessing ED resulting from nonmatching "paths." Patients without disease (prostate cancer or diabetes) gave similar ratings whatever the disease path described; however, there was a significant relationship between age and ED ratings, when ED was acquired as a result of ageing: the older they got, the higher ED was valued, irrespective of their sexual functioning. Experience with ED (sexual functioning) became important for respondents only when no disease path was provided (the vignette did not explain how ED was acquired). It is possible that patients found the matching-path versions of the task more meaningful and focused more on their experiences with the disease rather than their experiences with ED.
The study argues for providing individualized information to patients when assessing utilities. There is some evidence that using individualized information to construct descriptions of a health state can lead to better prediction of utilities. 18 However, more research is needed into how the "individualized information" approach could be effectively employed for the assessment of a range of health states. Other ways of reducing biases in utility assessment are currently being explored. For example, there is promising evidence that carefully drawing nonpatients' attention on how they might adapt to a health state over time can significantly increase their utilities for that heath state. 19, 20 On the other hand, attempts to reduce the focusing illusion have not been successful. 19, 21 The more knowledge we gain about how to describe health states appropriately and reduce expected biases, the more likely we are to obtain stable utilities that approximate patients' and nonpatients' long-term preferences about their health.
